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THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD Norwegian press reported ‘Hyundai Heavy I...

Norwegian press reported

‘Hyundai Heavy Industry worker’s fatality’…”Shocking information”

In April 2015, a Norwegian reporter who is working for magazine <Norwegian engineering magazine Teknisk Ukeblad> sent us an email. He said he would like to cover the case of Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below) subsidiary worker’s fatality. The ‘Network for HHI subcontractor’s occupational fatality and injury’ organized in May 2014 had issued press releases to foreign medias. The press releases include the occupational fatality data and all relevant information and questionnaire of occupational injuries in HHI to foreign investors and clients.

At the time of receiving the email, HHI just finished ‘Goliath’ offshore project which was contracted with the Norwegian company for the first cylindrical FPSO in the world. It appeared that the Norwegian reporter could not believe how many Korean workers were killed while the ship was being built, which was ordered from his country. Immediately, 3 articles were written through close communication with him and they were disclosed to the public around the time HHI built-‘Goliath’ arrived in Norway.

7 subcontractors died on HHI site in the first half of 2014. The public criticized but HHI did not seem to care. Ships are still being built in Ulsan where HHI is and workers are being exposed to danger.

South Korea has one of the highest occupational fatality rate in the world. Simply put, 12 workers die in South Korea when 1 worker dies in the U.K. Even though various factors can make this difference, the one clear thing is that more Koreans die working and more often. Korea’s occupational fatality is dominant among other OECD countries. Therefore, it is thought that dying ‘on the job’ is natural in South Korea but it is viewed differently by other countries.

When one of the researchers from Solidarity for Worker’s Health visited Sweden, he asked a question regarding Korea’s high occupational fatality rate and how it can be reduced and the Swedish researcher responded;

“Why do people die on the job?”

This means that worker’s safety follows the country’s safety protocols rather than the company’s.

Do they know workers are killed?

Most HHI’s investors and clients ordering ships are located overseas, mostly in Europe. Do they know that their ships are being built over the workers’ sacrifice?

In June 2014, the ‘Network for HHI subcontractor’s occupational fatality and injury (refer to as Network below)’ sent the first letter to Bank Investment Management in Norway and Netherlands. They conveyed the list of killed workers from 2004 to 2013 and the structural problem. They also described the danger 40,000 subcontracting workers are exposed to. The irresponsible subsidiary company, parent company HHI inducing it, and the existence of supply teams who are in the most danger were spoken as well. Then, they urged a responsible investment. Norges Bank Investment Management, Norway and ABP Netherlands are HHI’s investors.

Following this, the Asia headquarter of Dutch pension fund (APG) reached out to us. On 4th July, a business continuity and governance structure specialist from Asian headquarter visited Ulsan and met with subcontracting workers and he promised he would seek a structural resolution through the board.

We received a reply from 2 organizations in August and September 2014. Especially in the letter from ABP, there was a sentence; “For ABP, this is shocking information that raises a lot of questions that have to be answered by the company”.

Such action might have been shocking for individuals from a country where they wear a space suit looking PPE even for concrete road paving to hear that workers die from fall, suffocating and crushing. They responded that this news would be seriously discussed and they would look into other shipyards that may have same issues.

NBIM, Norway Bank Investment Management also sent us a similar intent of reply. Norges Bank is investing in more than 8,000 companies and owns a global fund portfolio. Their management mandate specifically requires them to use the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises at the basis of their active ownership efforts so they will discuss HHI’s occupational fatality in this principle, they said.

NBIM sent us another letter as below in March 2015 afterwards;

“ Generally, we consider companies should ensure that their business practices adhere to internationally recognized standards and conventions where applicable. Based on this, in March this year we wrote a letter to HHI’s board related to the alleged issues on the company’s approach to HMS issues. We are also monitoring the wider situation with regards to the complaints directed at the company”.

NBIM appreciated that we informed them of the issue.

International corporates thoroughly adhering to human rights guidelines

Such a strong reaction above was due to the ‘3 principles’. One of them is OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Originally, the Declaration and the Guidelines were adopted by OECD in 1976 and updated in 2011 for a fifth time. This guideline is seen as the standard of the activities OECD countries apply to multinational enterprises.

According to this guideline, multinational enterprises based on OECD countries should have – 1. Regardless places 2. The duty to protect human rights within the framework of internationally recognized human rights 3. Within the context of their own activities, avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and address such impacts when they occur 4. Have a policy commitment to respect human rights 5.Carry out human rights due diligence to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 6. Provide for or co-operate through legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts. In terms of aspect that this guideline has been developed by an authorized international organization, it is defined as a standard which has international universality.

The other one is UN Global Compact. It was officially launched in 2000 and encourages businesses worldwide to contribute in problem-solving for issues following globalization by adopting sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to align business with 10 principles on human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption. UN Global Compact is a relationship, not a regulation to force or mediate company’s operations or activities so it does not carry legal binding forces but in 2015, 8,368 companies from more than 161 countries are participating in. This is the way UN and companies directly promise to comply with human rights.

Lastly, ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ a kind of guideline, developed in 1999 by the ministerial meeting and revised in 2002 and it includes context in principle such as the rights and duties of shareholders and board, integrity of stakeholders, disclosure etc.

This document itself does not carry any legal binding power but this is being broadly adopted as a highly respected guideline by various policy makers, investors and companies.

When viewed in these 3 principles, HHI’s occupational fatalities are surely problematic to those investors. This is because neglect of the fatality on worksite is obvious neglect of their social responsibility against the principles. It must be uncomfortable to see their invested company’s such problematic action as an investor.

HHI “I don’t know”, a consistent answer to the issue

As described, foreign companies see the structure has a serious problem but HHI, actually is consistently turning a blind eye. On 29th September 2014, the Network sent a questionnaire to HHI regarding ‘Occupational accident status for HHI subcontractors’ and ‘Occupational safety’. It was right after another subcontractor’s fatality in August and 3 worker’s suffocation occupational injury at Hyundai Mipo Dockyard, an affiliate of HHI in June.

The questionnaire consisted of 7 clauses;

1. The role and outcome of Occupational Health and Safety Committee

2. The specific details of 300 billion won investment announced in ‘Comprehensive renovation measures for Safe administration’

3. The details of ‘HHI total assessment result’ measured by Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency and the next step plan

4. The status for imputation of occupational hazard and accidents, conceal and discrimination of subcontractors’ occupational accident

5. Regular report and disclosure of occupational accident related policies and outcomes

6. The recent progress of follow ups for the subcontractor’s fatality in August and 3 worker’s suffocation occupational injury at Hyundai Mipo Dockyard in June

7. Additional indicators of ‘human rights’, ‘labor’ and ‘society’ in CSR report

We have advised them a deadline, 20th October to reply but HHI is not responding at all till now.

2 more workers were killed during November and December and another 2 were killed and one in coma this year. Would it be a co-occupational injury? HHI subcontractors are still being killed at this time and HHI is running subcontracting companies out of business as a part of restructuring from early this year.

The subcontractor’s labor union is only a tenuous group which needs a huge courage to knock an HHI’s door.

There is news that Mr. Jung, the major shareholder of HHI is running for FIFA presidency during this time blacklisted workers due to company shut-down, joining the subcontractors’ labor union to hold an all-night demonstration at the HHI main gate over 100 days.

How long Should Korean subcontracting workers continue to work in such a hazardous environment? It appears that this will be continued for a while. We have sent the same letter we sent to Norway and Netherland to Korean National Pension Service (NPS) as NPS is also a stockholder of HHI. I would like to end this article with the reply from NPS;

“It is not clear the direct relation between the raised issue and our NPS’s stable return on investment. Moreover, NPS’s exclusive benefits in such as 5%, 10% appraised value, short-term difference return can be deprived and operations can be directly restricted in the case NPS interferes the matter of company’s own administration as it can be considered as administration participation according to Capital Market Act.

Currently, there are various opinions suggested from several stakeholders for NPS’s responsible investment and the discussion for range and boundary of responsible investment has not been agreed yet in the fund operation committee, the top decision maker.

Thus, within the current fund operation regulation system, NPS is difficult to meet your request”.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD Pyramid contract ‘Mul-yang team’, causes deat...

Pyramid contract ‘Mul-yang team’, causes death

Subcontracting companies are referred to ‘absolute yes men’ in shipyards. It helps prime contractors improve their competitive power by securing employment flexibility and low labor cost. It also guarantees the elasticity of employment by reducing the number of subcontractors in the yard during recession while they earned the cost reduction benefit by extending it in boom days.

The typical example was dismissing subcontractors instead of permanent employees who are under labors union protection during the congestion of shipbuilding industry since 2008, economic crisis.

The reason why this is feasible is because subcontracting companies are almost a part of the prime contracting shipyard, not just a client-customer contract. It means they are simply a department aligned with ‘command-order’. Prime contractors exercise the same level of control as those subcontracting companies’ production department in the construction quantity and cost overall related matters. Subcontracting company’s management capability is merely referred to securing manpower but nothing else.

The effect was considerable as shipbuilding industry was more labor-intensive than manufacturing business so they gradually increased the number of subcontractors. According to the report ‘The spread of subcontractors in shipbuilding industry and the current number by process’ published by a labor researcher from Metal Union, The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions in 2014, 35,712 permanent employee technicians and 105,041 subcontractor technicians were counted from the major 9 shipyards in 2013. The ratio of employees and subcontractors was 294.1% and simply, that means there are 1 employee to 3 subcontractors in shipyards. In 2003, the ratio was only 107.5% and 33.3% in 1993, even further back 20 years ago.

When did this subcontracting system start? To understand it, we should examine the subcontracting system developing process for Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to HHI below), ‘the world largest shipbuilding company’.

Subcontracting system started from ‘Delegated management system’

According to the report ‘the development and spread of subcontracting system: a case study of HHI’ published by sociologist Prof. Woncheol Shin at Pusan National University, it has existed from the very first time shipyards were born. In early 1970, it launched under the name of ‘Delegated management system’ in HHI and it was a type of indirect labor management system which at that time the management had a lack of direct control capacity for work productivity.

The reason why HHI adopted a subcontracting system was because the management did not have an efficient supervising system to control the work process. There was no consideration or system that existed back in early 1970s in shipyards in regards how to manage workers or which work to order.

By the late 1970s, however, this confusion has disappeared. The management learned how to manage productivity and started to control workers directly from experiences. They also comprehended the production process and directly managed the workforce as their management competency reached over a certain level. Eventually, the subcontracting system was considered an obstacle in the productivity improvement.

Hereby, HHI started directly hiring subcontractors to employees so the number of 12,629 subcontractors in 1978 went down to 5,423 in 1983 and it kept going down during this period. However, it skyrocketed from 6,084 in 1980 to 17,114 in 1984.

Disappeared subcontractors after labor strife, but…

Since then, HHI did not switch subcontractors to employees. After securing a certain number of employees, they also left a certain number of subcontractors to utilize in employment control period and for particular work process.

However, their plan was undone by labor strife in 1987. Employees and subcontractors both claimed labor rights and this played a role in eliminating subcontracting jobs in HHI in 1989. Workers suggested the offer for converting subcontractors to employees.

A number of problematic issues have arisen since then. Since the labor strife in 1987, the HHI’s turnover rate in production workers has decreased but new hire has also stopped at the same time due to labor congestion. Moreover, pay has increased every year due to pressure from unions.

To respond to the situation, HHI started to increase the number of subcontractors from 1990s so that they can protect workforce from the expansion of union influence as well as cost reduction and labor flexibility.

The government, however, was very passive in regulating the move, namely indirect employment. Conglomerate-oriented unions were the same. Employers have more extended the subcontracting structure in turn and this is the reason why there are subcontracting here.

‘Individual contract system’ on construction site to ‘Mul-yang team in shipyard

The problem is that this subcontracting system is becoming more subdivided as time goes. As the scale grew, the subcontract formed a subdivision. It is basically a secondary subcontract called ‘Mul-yang team’, same as ‘individual contract system’ on construction sites. The ‘Mul-yang team’ is referred to those who are working anywhere they are asked. Subcontracting companies hire these people for a short term (1-3 months) when they have a shortage of staff to meet the contracted date to complete project. The Mul-yang team workers are paid more than subcontractors as they have to work intensively.

The complaint from subcontractors during the time was the discrimination between them and permanent employees such as less bonus and exception from welfare benefits provided by shipyard even though they were delegated with much harder works. This is why most skilled subcontractors are moving to Mul-yang team.

Quoting from ‘Labor condition status study for Mul-yang team in shipbuilding industry 2015’ published by Metal Union, it was found that shipyard D has 13,000 Mul-yang team workers among 30,000 subcontractors in Apr 2015. Shipyard S’s 60% of subcontractors were also a Mul-yang team.

Nowadays, ironically, the 1st subcontracting companies are being considered safe in employing structure so even a new word ‘subcontractor original’ was generated for those workers.

Accelerating workers’ deaths

The attention point is that those Mul-yang team workers are the victims of occupational injury. The director of HHI union Mr. Hyoung-kyun Kim explained the reason why more occupational injuries are being occurred in Mul-yang team;

“The primary contract company pressures subcontracting companies to lower prices. So those subcontracting companies in turn more focus on the process efficiency over safety to save labor costs. This is the reason why they call Mul-yang team. Though individual worker’s price is higher than subcontractors, they are more efficient. As a result, it is being done this way, efficiency over safety by adding a large number of Mul-yang team. This makes work environment more unstable and this trend is ongoing.

Another concern is that Mul-yang team frequently move from one place to another. They move when they are nearly used to the site. On the other hand, they have to get used to new working environment all the time. A welder who worked on the same site, for example, is well aware which valve gives better gas. He also knows which signalers have what habits so he can work through his pace. A new worker, however, does not know those things at all. Shipyard workers should co-work connectively but it is difficult for newcomers.

Moving around without settling is a problem. It plays a factor that makes their after-work life insecure. Mul-yang team workers live in accommodation provided by the company, so they can’t stay with their families and carry on stable lives. Namely, their life structure is insecure and this brings problem at work site.

Half of the fatalities that occurred at HHI in 2014 actually were in Mul-yang team. This complicated pyramid system is accelerating subcontractor’s deaths over labor flexibility.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD “Mongjoon Jeong is coming to HHI to coll...

“Mongjoon Jeong is coming to HHI to collect bills”

“They have been expanding their affiliates from sweets gathered by squeezing subcontractors. Now, they are not just squeezing to cut their deficit but asking for deaths.” (Manager A, HHI subcontracting company)

Continuous deficit for 6 quarters from Q4 in 2013 to Q1 this year has been reported; an accumulated deficit of 3.5 trillion won. This is the story of the world’s largest shipbuilding company, Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below). However, they had won victory after victory beforehand.

HHI’s affiliates are 27 (Dec 2014); Hyundai Merchant Marine, Hyundai Oil Bank, Hotel Hyundai to name a few. HHI was separated from Hyundai group in 2002 after ‘prince’s revolt’ and has expanded their affiliates from late 2000’s.

Starting with Hi Investment & Securities in 2008, they bought Hotel Hyundai in 2009 and New Korea Tour in 2012. In their M&A statistics after Feb 2010, HHI took over 5 companies spending 3,087,200,000,000 won. From this, 2,893,300,000,000 won was spent to buy Hyundai Oil Bank (94% of total investment).

Unforgotten shareholder’s dividends

The amount of holding share is also considerable. HHI, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard and Samho Heavy Industry have more than 3,100,000,000,000 won worth of sellable listed company’s stocks.

From an audit report in 2014 Q3, HHI holds almost 1,400 billion won; Hyundai Motors (4.4 million stocks worth 740 billion won), Kia Motors (88,000 stocks worth 490 billion won), Hyundai Elevator (217,000 stocks worth 12.9 billion won) and Hyundai Merchant Marine (23 million stocks worth 640 billion won).

Hyundai Samho Heavy Industry holds stocks valued at 1.5 trillion won; Hyundai Motors (2,265,000 stocks, 380 billion won), Hyundai Merchant Marine (10 million stocks, 288 billion won) and POSCO (1,308,000 stocks, 380 billion won). Hyundai Mipo Dockyard also holds 397,000 stocks in KCC worth 230 billion won.

HHI recently invested 248.6 billion won in Hyundai Hotel, their affiliate, in July this year. It was the sum of 73.5 billion won cash and 175.1 billion won investment in kind.

This is why it was pointed out that their deficit can be paid off by selling some of their stocks.

They also didn’t forget to pay shareholders. HHI gave 2.082 trillion won dividend in cash to shareholders from 2007 to 2014. From this, share dividend between 2010 and 2014 was 1.103 trillion won. It means they regularly gave share dividend even during the recession period of shipbuilding industry after the economic crisis.

Mr. Mong-joon Jeong, the largest shareholder of HHI received 61.5 billion won dividend in 2008, 61.6 billion won in 2009, 28,740 million won in 2010, 30.8 billion won in 2012 and 15.3 billion won in 2014.

The HHI CEO Mr. Jaesung Lee, who made the biggest deficit since its founding, received 3.699 billion won retirement bonus in Sep 2014. The salary of the board was also increased to 6.150 billion won, which was 1.950 billion more than 2014. They are continually making money while saying publicly there is a deficit.

Subcontractors were given nothing while dividends were paid and affiliates grew.

‘My effort and your fault’

Of course, business can’t always be good. HHI made 171 billion won business loss in the Q2 this year.

HHI is trying to make it up by restructuring of labor. 1,500 office workers were dismissed and it is going on for subcontractors. In July 2015, 3,000 subcontractors were fired. As 48 subcontracting companies closed down, subcontractors naturally lost their jobs and they were replaced with lower-cost subcontracting companies.

The reason why subcontracting companies shut down is due to the ‘smashing contracting price’.

This leads to the structure workers where are “dying on the job”. The flow of ‘low priced contract – insufficient budget – rushed completion time– low labor price –low price applied’ continues and the ‘rushed completion time’ plays a role of murderer in occupational injury.

It is the way they expand affiliates and divide more dividends to shareholders during boom times and pass deficits onto subcontractors in recessions.

“If there were no astronomical money divided to large shareholders, HHI could be well operated.”

Mr. Chang-min Ha, the director of HHI subcontracting branch said, “They took all profits and expanded more affiliates in surplus but didn’t share the profit with subcontractors. Now, they are passing the pain onto subcontractors in deficit”.

Mr. Ha also said, “Numerous subcontracting companies are bankrupted in line due to the ‘smashing contract price’ and subcontractors are exposed to deaths as well as delay in payment and dismissal in this circumstance. If there were no astronomical money divided to large shareholders, HHI could be well operated. There is no solution as long as shareholders are greedy. They are squeezing HHI to fill their pockets so subcontractors are squeezed as a result”.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD ‘Old’ Blacklist, still valid?

‘Old’ Blacklist, still valid?

Before 1987, pub owners used to encamp in front of Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below) main gate on payday to collect bills left unpaid by shipyard workers. At the time there was no salary bank transaction system, workers were paid in cash in an envelope with their name. They were paid about 200,000-250,000 won after 400 hours work a month.

With a month’s salary, they spent half to live and half to payback bills at pubs. Because many failed to pay their tabs, pub owners encamped at their workplaces. They desperately searched to catch workers holding cash in their hands and going home.

On HHI’s payday, pubs were packed with drunken workers who couldn’t even walk. They used to drink to dawn and go straight to work after a few hour sleep on the street and this lasted another 2-3 days after payday. It was the life of shipyard workers who had no future and could be injured anytime. They took out the stress from hard work with alcohol.

Most workers didn’t mean to work there for long but rather find something else after the short-intensive work at shipyards. As the union at HHI, the fight for democracy in 1987 was organized, however, this phenomenon gradually disappeared.

HHI workers did a strike, sit-in and street demonstration for 56 days from 28th July to 21st September 1987 asking 17 requests including liberalization on hair style and pay increase. As a result, their meager salaries jumped every year. The insulting work atmosphere represented by hairstyle restrictions at shipyards also disappeared. Occupational injury also relatively decreased. Dangerous working environments were improved through the union. The number of dying workers on the job visually went down.

People on ‘blacklist’, dismissed by filtering

Let’s talk about 2004, 17 years later. After the labor strife in 1987, HHI worked out a strategy for double discriminative employing management. They attempted labor control and cost reduction by extending subcontractors. On the other hand, they appealed to their employees. According to Korean shipbuilding association, the number of subcontractor increased from 1,998 in 1990 to 12,276 in 2004.

As a result, subcontractors became in charge of all avoided work by HHI employees. There was also discrimination in salary and welfare. Annual bonuses were less and more subcontractors died of Occupational injury.

Subcontractors’ complaint grew. They wanted to keep their rights by organizing a union as employees. In Aug 2013, HHI subcontractor union launched.

However, even fundamental union activities were not protected. As soon as someone was revealed as a member, they were fired or they became unemployed as their subcontracting company shut down with ‘business difficulty’. As an example, HHI subcontractor union submitted an establishment registration paper at the district office and the listed union members’ working subcontracting company had to shut down.

Watching the birth of HHI union in 1987 and followed strife, HHI had to stop organizing another union for subcontractors. HHI consistently avoided and impeded unions.

In the meantime, a subcontractor Mr. Il-soo Park killed himself. His will said, ‘Subcontracting workers are also humans. We want to live like other decent humans.’

It was 14th Feb 2004. On top of this, there was an unilateral announcement of pay cut for power grinder workers. This triggered 150 subcontractors from 10 different subcontracting companies to officially join the union.

However, the consequence was miserable. The day after Mr. Park’s funeral, all union members were fired by filtering. After shutting down subcontracting companies where union members are, non-union workers were re-hired by different companies.

Workers, who haven’t stepped onto HHI ground in 11 years

Now, let’s talk about the year 2015, 11 years later since then. During the time, the number of subcontractors increased by 3 times from 12,000 to 37,040 (HHI employee 26,880). However, subcontractors’ working conditions have not been changed compared to 11 years ago. 13 subcontractors were killed at work in year 2014.

From this circumstance, there was a move to gather subcontractors again at HHI. The subcontracting union buckled down to join the union with HHI’s union but their organizational power is very weak.

Joining a union is not simple. They tried to attract people to join but they couldn’t stand forward although they would like to. They were afraid of being dismissed.

Above all, the blacklisting of 11 years ago still discourages workers to join a union.

Workers fired 11 years ago while organizing a union cannot step onto HHI ground even now. Apart from HHI’s affiliate, they cannot work for Daewoo and Samsung shipyard either. Instead, they are working around small shipyards. HHI denies there is a blacklist but evidence suggests otherwise.

This blacklist is a huge obstacle for subcontractors to join a union. From the survey of 1,400 subcontractors by HHI and subcontracting union in 2014, 36.5% answered yes for ‘are you willing to join a union?’. However, 61.7% replied the reason they can’t join is ‘due to dismissal and blacklist’.

“Workers on the site should have stop-work authority”

“People who officially joined the union in 2004 still can’t work for HHI today. They are floating around Gunsan, Tongyoung, Jinhae where small shipyards are, being apart from their families. They joined the union to live a decent human life but the result was tragic and it still continues. HHI subcontractors witnessed the circumstance and they were stigmatized that they cannot work at any major shipyards if they join the union. That’s why it is not easy to join.”

Ms. Mi-hyang Hyun, the director of Ulsan Occupational injury Free Association also added, “The reason many subcontractors cannot join the union is due to the blacklist. Their fear toward blacklist is tremendous.”

According to ‘The formation and development of subcontracting system’ published by Prof. Won-cheol Choi at the department of sociology, Busan National University, the 2 most important types of regulation in labor markets are defined as ‘Direct, legal regulation by the government’ and ‘Regulation by collective bargaining of labor union’. By binding these, discriminative and unfair practices can be stopped to repeat in the employment.

However, the ‘regulation by government’ exists but doesn’t function and the collective bargaining wouldn’t dare dream without union. The problem is the working environment becomes more devastated as this structure persists.

Mr. Hyung-kyun Kim, the policy director of HHI union said, “HHI employees have a union representative who can listen to their requests and solve problems but subcontractors don’t. As they don’t have anywhere to address, they felt upset and desperate”.

Mr. Ha claims that being injured or dying on the job cannot help but to continue in this structure. He also said, “We need union’s activities guaranteed so that we can refuse and resist hazardous works. Without this, extending safety facilities and establishing safety rules are just a stopgap measure”.

Ms. Hyun added, “It is almost impossible to change the reckless working environment of individual subcontractors alone, who are hungry to work. Subcontractors’ union should grow their power to run stop-work authority in hazardous works and improve work environment”.

To reduce occupational injury, subcontractors should be involved in the decision-making process for working condition as a group; namely, the structure which fundamental labor rights come true is critical. However, the infamous ‘blacklist’ which started in 1970’s is still impeding it forty years later.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD "What is should be like... what it really i... file

"What is should be like... what it really is like"

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD “Nobody stops running on a single log br...

“Nobody stops running on a single log bridge”

“It’s the same as asking someone to run across a single log bridge but don’t fall down”

(Mr. Chang-min Ha, the director of HHI(Hyundai heavy Industry) subcontracting branch office)

It is contradicting each other asking to finish 10 day-long work within 5 days and don’t get hurt on the job at the same time but this irony has been a daily routine at shipyards for a long time.

This is not due to ‘vicious capitalist’ individuals themselves but the nature of capitalism, namely the structure. The core nature of capitalism is ‘profit maximization’. The purpose is to produce the most profit with as little effort and capital. Then, the profit is divided into shareholders.

Let’s talk about Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below). The labor exploitation extends to re-exploitation in the pyramid labor structure from one subcontracting company to another. The most typical way is ‘smashing contract price (unit per ton)’. The profit made by squeezing subtracting companies is paid to Mr. Mong-joon Jeong, the major shareholder.

The nature of capitalism chokes workers with ‘invisible hands’. Their wages are delayed and they lose their lives on the job. Under this pretense of ‘maximizing profit’, numerous workers “vanish” in silence. 13 workers were killed in 2014 in HHI. They were sacrificed by man-made disasters due to a reduction of impractical completion date and lack of safety measures.

The government is aware that it is a serious issue. The labor bureau of a local branch in Busan conducted a special industrial health and safety supervision for HHI as 3 workers were killed within a month in March 2014.

Supervision report said that HHI's safety actions were poor

According to ‘<HHI> Industrial health and safety special supervision report’ <Pressian> secured, HHI’s safety actions were poor in various aspects and they were detected as below;

ㅿHigh risk for traditional occupational injury such as fall, electric shock, crash, falling objects following not enough lights at worksite, electrical power turned off, crane hook release machine not installed, safety fence not installed

ㅿHHI’s HSE personnel did not take responsibility to supervise

ㅿSpecial medical exam items missing for 275 HHI employees and 511 subcontractors of 26 subcontracting companies

ㅿUsed unapproved high place work platforms and pressure vessels

The labor bureau of a local branch in Busan indicated 562 violations against Occupational Health and Safety Acts and 519 (92.4%) were contributed by HHI and 40 (7.1%) by subcontracting companies.

In specific, violation for safety measures were 392 (69.6%) and control of harmful factors 19 (3.4%), health measures 20(3.6%), working environment measures and health examination 37 (6.6%) respectively.

For actions taken in regards to the violations, there were 376 judicial processes, 41 stop-works, 18 stop-uses, 92 fines (1,060,820,000 won), 375 correction orders, and 80 official suggestions.

The labor bureau, “Lack of safety prior business philosophy and policy”

The labor bureau local branch in Busan showed evidence of ‘Lack of safety prior business philosophy and policy’ related to HHI’s occupational health and safety operation system in the report.

First of all, they pointed out the reduced budget for safety investment by 61% from 26,304,510,000 won in 2011 to 10,200,760,000 in 2013 despite the unchanged occupational injury rate for last 3 years (2011~2013). According to Occupational Health and Safety Agency, HHI had 143 occupational injury in 2011 and 188 in 2012, 180 in 2013, respectively. It appears the more occupational injuries the less the safety budget it is.

Moreover, HHI was indicated with the same issue during the special supervision ordered in 2014 as they were in 2013. The labor bureau of a local branch in Busan referred this as “Lack of safety prior business philosophy and policy” and also said “The management’s willingness and effort are required to stop repeated violations by facility improvement, reinforce safety awareness and zero tolerance for violations etc.”

They also stated that HHI’s support for the health and safety measures in the yard was insufficient. Considering the shipyard’s nature of simultaneously occurring multiple work process and the complicated mixture of HHI employees and subcontractors in the yard, HHI’s support for subcontractors is necessary but it isn’t followed in reality.

Another point was that only 35% out of 234 HSE personnel had industrial safety related certification. The labor bureau added, “Being able to see risks is the first step of safety by reinforcing training is required.”

“The labor bureau is not influencing HHI at all”

What was the outcome of special supervision by the labor bureau? At the time HHI was pointed out with many issues, they invested 30,000,000,000 won in disaster risk and preventive measures to re-inspect and improve. They also increased the number of safety personnel for subcontractors by 2 times around 200.

Fatalities, however, didn’t stop. 8 more workers were killed after the special supervision and one of them was killed during the supervision period on 28th Apr. He fell into the sea during signaling a transport. It would have been prevented if the safety fence had been installed.

Actually, the labor bureau’s special supervision to HHI wasn’t conducted in only 2014 but every year since 2011 and they did not correct the problems. ‘Violation specifics of special supervision in 2013, for example, repeatedly pointed out uninstalled preventive measures for fall and safety fence. This is the reason why the special supervision is called only “showing off”.

Mr. Chang-min Ha, the director of HHI subcontracting branch explained why special supervisions are not effective “Because those labor bureau inspectors do not understand the shipyard’s situation”. He added, “They should come at any random time to inspect the real working condition and situation but they only look around the areas which HHI have set up specifically”.

Thus, the supervision report cannot put HHI under pressure. Mr. Ha said, “Although it looks like HHI is imposed with legal controls through the special supervision apparently, HHI is not taking any responsibilities in reality because the labor bureau cannot put any pressure on HHI.”

The government which should protect people’s lives, but….

This is why it is insisted that random supervisions should be conducted instead of those ‘showing off’ special supervisions to reduce occupational injuries. However, even this is not easy. Industrial safety inspectors in labor bureau are assigned in different locations and the number is not enough. There are 66 inspectors working in Busan branch, which is supervising HHI.

According to the data Seok-hyun Lee at New Politics Alliance for Democracy party received from the labor bureau in Oct 2014, the ratio per one industrial safety inspector in Busan to workplace is 3,988 and the number of managing workers is 35,614. Overall, all 348 inspectors are taking care of 4,850 workplaces and 42,364 workers per person. Namely, it is impossible to randomly inspect.

Mr. Se-min Park, the health and safety director of Metal Union claimed ‘customized inspection’. He said, “The small number of industrial safety inspectors in labor bureau is scattered in all different locations and this is inefficient. They should be assigned by type of industries, shipbuilding, auto, chemical etc. for instance, and inspect randomly. Then, occupational injuries will decrease but the labor bureau argues it is not their fault, citing manpower, budget etc.”.

In Pursuit of profit above all means is the nature of capitalism in Korea. Containing and supervising the nature of capitalism is the duty of government. We are not talking about the ‘big government’ quoted in post-capitalism. Keeping the life and safety of people is the reason why the government exists. However, it is doubtful if the government is doing their imposed duty.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD “Occupational Injury?” You didn’t call 11... file

“Occupational Injury?” You didn’t call 119, did you?!”

On the 29th July 2015, Mr. Lee (34) was crushed by a forklift truck and dragged over 5 meters. His coworker urgently called 119. However, the ambulance couldn’t even get into the factory but returned back to their depot as his company “claimed” he sustained a ‘minor laceration’. What happened to Mr. Lee afterward? He ended up dying due to the lack of emergency care.

It is natural that 119 is not called at work even though workers are injured to conceal occupational injuries. Occupational injuries are being concealed by a secret promise among company owners, subcontracting companies and hospitals.

<Pressian> has made a ‘messenger’ formed process showing how occupational injuries are hidden by companies when they occur at worksite. It was designed by Bo-hwa Jang.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD ‘Smashing’ subcontracting companies, ‘chokin...

‘Smashing’ subcontracting companies, ‘choking’ workers

‘Quickly quickly’ – is a common theme in Korean’s mentality. There are a few theories on the origin of this. One of these is the ‘agricultural society’ which has lasted over 5,000 years. In terms of the climate of Korean peninsula, works such as rice planting, irrigating a paddy and harvest should be done on time seasonally and intensively. If they miss the right time, they ruin the whole farming throughout the year. As a result, farmers get used to ‘quickly quickly’ to be on time each season. They have to work to death to survive from hunger for their children as well as themselves. This might be the background of Koreans ‘quickly quickly’ culture.

While Japan revived their economy by ‘reduction-oriented’, South Korea has achieved ‘compressed growth’ by this ‘quickly quickly’ culture. Of course, side effects followed at the same time. The ‘quickly quickly’ culture contributed to a ‘half-ass’ culture, which sees shortcuts become a norm of society.

Risk-taking culture follows compressed growth. A ‘quickly quickly’ culture which wants to regain things left behind rapidly produced a risk-taking culture and this again accelerated ‘quickly quickly’ culture. This circumstance led Korean society to become a ‘Brutal society’ instead of a risky society then.

Let’s have a look at the ‘World’s largest shipbuilding company’ Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below). This shipyard was built in 1974 when Jung-hui Park was a president and Korea was a late runner compared to Japan and other countries. There were a lack of skills and experience. They, however, now have the title of the world’s largest. The ‘quickly quickly’ culture lay on the back of their success by being competitive and completing ships before the due date.

Adverse effects were also considerable. Numerous workers, for instance, died building ships. The year the first HHI ship was completed, 22 workers were killed and 19, 15, and 23 each year afterward.

Moreover, deaths are still ongoing. The only difference is shifting the ‘risk-taking culture’ from their employees to subcontractors. To examine the problematic structure, <Pressian> interviewed HHI’s subcontracting company owner with difficulty. He explained how the process is being done and how the ‘risk-taking culture’ is being passed onto contractors in detail.

“It is strange if workers are not killed in this environment”

On 11th June this year, Mr. Kang (44), a HHI’s subcontractor was killed crushed by a 800 kg steel sheet during the steel fabrication process. The mass-fabrication is the process that makes a large steel sheet by welding individual 800 kg steel sheets. After a temporary welding the 800 kg steel sheet on 1.5 meter high stand with a crane, a main welding is being done after separating the steel sheet from a crane.

At least 3 stands are necessary per 800 kg steel sheet but this rule was not followed. Furthermore, the steel sheet was separated from a crane even before temporary welding. This is why the incident occurred as the stand collapsed not enduring the weight. It wouldn’t have happened with a temporary welding. It was a disaster called by the ‘quickly quickly’ culture.

“Bluntly speaking, the incident in June was caused by the contracted price (the unit cost per ton). The subcontracting company had worked with HHI less than a month and didn’t even join a HHI subcontracting committee. This company was a replacement for the previous subcontracting company which didn’t survive from HHI’s cost ‘smashing’ and was kicked out. Of course, this company accepted the reduced cost so this incident followed. As the contracted price is too low, they couldn’t help save labor costs. It is the way they complete a month-long work within 15 days so that they can meet the estimated price.”

The HHI subcontracting company owner A also added, “Wouldn’t incidents occur in this situation?”. He also said, “It’s even awkward if not”. Separating steel sheets without a temporary welding and not installing steel stands etc. are all to complete the work ahead of schedule.

It is no exaggeration to say that labor cost is the actual process fee in shipyards. Thus, cutting labor hours is the easiest way they can save costs. If the contracted price is cut by half, they have to finish a month-long work within 15 days accordingly. That’s how subcontracting companies make profits.

The problem is that cutting price is not only limited to individual subcontracting companies. According to the subcontracting company owner A, 60% of HHI’s subcontracting companies out of 272 could not pay their workers’ salary. A lot of them were accused by the labor bureau, not paying worker’s salaries and superannuation.

In this environment, it is not easy for them to install safety fence or conduct a safety orientation because they have to pay the rate for the hours of safety orientation and this type of incident in June happened as a result.

“HHI’s trick”

Then, why are HHI budgets this ridiculous price? Mr. A says it’s due to “HHI’s trick”.

“It has been 3 years since HHI cuts the contracted price claiming that they received a ship order with a low price. Then, they reduced the contracted priced with us from 10,000,000 won to 5,000,000 won. They said their business is in trouble and that their deficit would be 8% by 2018 and that the deficit should be divided equally; HHI 4% and subcontracting companies 4%. This is what they say publicly but in reality they will exploit subcontracting companies as much as they can and spit them out.”

By July this year, 48 subcontracting companies closed down in HHI. Mr. A has testified that they become bankrupt due to the ridiculous price contracted by HHI.

The point we need to pay attention to is that those shut down companies are being replaced by short-term companies. In HHI’s subcontracting companies, there are officially registered companies, temporary companies and short-term companies. The short-term company is referred to as 3 month working. These don’t even join subcontracting company committee nor deposit the amount of money registered companies should. While 48 subcontracting companies shut down, 90 more short-term companies appeared.

A also said, “Contracts between HHI and subcontracting companies state that HHI cannot close down subcontracting companies but instead make subcontracting companies to self-destruct by low contract price. They smash the price by killing registered subcontracting companies.”

HHI gets rid of not-well controlled officially registered subcontracting companies and replace them with short-term companies and, control them as they want. According to Mr. A, HHI adopted their own evaluation system from 1st Jan this year. They intend to kick out subcontracting companies by low rates if they don’t listen to HHI. It is a ‘flexible subcontractors’ over ‘flexible labor’.

This means there is a higher chance of incidents happening. The incident in June was also from a 3 month short-term company after the registered one closed down.

Mr. Chang-min Ha, the director of HHI subcontracting branch office explained, “Now it is deemed that dying on the job is natural due to the ‘quickly quickly’ process. Unless this structure changes, deaths will continue like now”.

Although Korea’s shipbuilding industry became world’s number one in the 21st century, the attitude of shipbuilders still remains as it did 40 years ago; at the level of developing countries. It means the hardware has improved but the system which operates the hardware still lives in the past. This stigmatizes our society as a ‘Brutal Society’.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD Blowing the whistle “How did I blackmail ...

Blowing the whistle “How did I blackmail them?”

It is said the worst moment of life naturally comes in silence. It was 2012. One Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below) subcontractor collapsed with a heart attack at work. They needed an ambulance urgently but his company didn’t call 119 as they should do but transferred the worker to a hospital by a company truck.

What happened as a result? He died before his arrival at the hospital. The worst thing happened, dying on a truck due to the lack of emergency action.

It is common practice at shipyards not calling 119 when workers are injured. Nobody questions this but close their eyes with silence. When 3 workers fell into the sea due to scaffold collapsed in 2014, the company didn’t call 119 and one of them was found dead.

The reason why companies are not calling 119 is to conceal industrial accidents. If they call 119, it is recorded as injured on the job. Avoiding this is the first step of industrial accident concealment. People in this industry say it can be concealed as long as it is not recorded and that is why injured workers are transferred by company truck, manager’s car or motorbike other than an ambulance.

What methods are used to hide the truth? <Pressian> interviewed one of HHI subcontracting company managers with difficulty, who has worked in shipyard industry over 30 years and 7 years at his present company. He was in charge for basically ‘everything’.

Manager A explained how HHI subcontracting company’s hide industrial accidents and why in detail. The news has always been “someone said..” but the manager gave in depth description of what has happened. This is first time HHI subcontracting manager was interviewed with the media. The interview as follows;

“I also blackmailed and appealed to them not to apply for the industrial accident compensation insurance (refer to as IACI below)”

Pressian: Have you ever directly stopped any injured workers applying for the IACI while working as a subcontracting company manager?

A: Yes, I have several times over 7 years. One time, one worker crashed his bicycle on his way to work and his knee bursa was ruptured. He was going to apply for the IACI but I stopped him. There are many others. I blackmailed and appealed to them not to apply for the IACI.

Pressian: I’ve heard subcontracting companies take measures when injured workers go to a hospital.

A: It’s true. Surely injured ones go to a hospital. Because there are so many work injuries, subcontracting companies usually designate a certain hospital to refer their people. We refer the injured worker first then, make a call to an administration director of the hospital.

Pressian: Why do you call a hospital administration director? It doesn’t sound like asking them to take good care of him.

A: It is important to take primary measures to stop process in the industrial accident compensation. It shouldn’t be recorded as ‘occupational injury’. If recorded, it’s irreversible. As per protocol, any injuries at work should be considered as industrial accident and it should go through the IACI process whether individuals want or not. We call a hospital administration director to stop this.

Pressian: So, does that mean you call and ask them to fake the medical record as ‘non-work related’ injuries by referring your workers to a designated hospital?

A: We simply say ‘Prepare it’ to them and they take care of it. They fake the record that the worker was injured outside of work.

Pressian: Isn’t it illegal? How is it possible? Moreover, they will go to hospital with a work clothes on. I can’t understand how they record “injured outside of work” in that circumstance. Why would they fake it for you?

A: Hospitals welcome subcontracting companies. Our designated hospital is the same. Patients are their income in the hospital point of view, so the more patients the more profit. Subcontracting companies are seen as money to them. Many get injured as the working environment is poor so many hospitals lobby subcontracting companies through their hospital administration directors asking us to designate their hospitals to treat.

Pressian: How do they lobby?

A: Fruit box, gift vouchers or wines are sent to subcontracting company owners and managers on New year or Thanks giving day. Often, managers receive entertainment treats from hospital administration directors.

“We will refer our injured ones to you and don’t let them receive IACI”

Pressian: Are hospitals’ lobbying to attract more patients to their hospitals?

A: Yes, it’s basically a ‘customer-client’ relationship so hospitals can’t help listen to what subcontracting companies ask. It is important for us not processing the IACI. Hospitals readily accept when we suggest ‘we will refer our people to your hospital and you should take care of the IACI. Because whatever the payment method is, like though the IACI or company or patient, hospitals can make profit as long as they are paid.

Pressian: But they are coming to hospitals having work clothes on. It may not be easy to write injured outside of worksite. Workers may also explain to the physician how they were injured.

A: Doctors should ask how patients were injured but it’s not a problem as it is already plotted. 100% patients wearing work clothes were hurt at work. Maybe only 1-2 out of 100 would be injured on the way home and most are work-related but doctors don’t question about it.

Even though he or she does, it’s not easy for the injured person to tell the truth because company manager or safety staff often accompanies the injured worker to the hospital. When a doctor asks ‘how did you get injured?’, those company managers answer ‘it was a bicycle accident outside, hurt outside of the factory’ on behalf of the worker without giving time for workers to answer.

Pressian: Can’t the injured person apply for IACI individually although the hospital record is false?

A: True, that’s why we blackmail and beg them at our best to stop applying for IACI so that we can conceal the incident. Once the hospital record is arranged, a subcontracting company manager visits injured worker to see how it goes and sound him or she out by saying ‘It doesn’t look too bad at all’. If the injured one insists to apply for IACI, we blackmail and beg.

Pressian: How do you blackmail?

A: We say something workers can abide by. We scold them to just accept the company’s suggestion (hospital bill paid by the company) rather than being dismissed after applying for IACI. Most accept. Often, workers pay hospital bills out of their pockets.

It’s because those subcontractors who are fingered as someone to watch won’t be able to get a job anywhere else so they agree.

“We can’t help but to hide industrial accidents to please shipyards”

Pressian: Why do subcontracting companies stop their workers applying for IACI? Is this because subcontracting companies are not joining IACI?

A: We do. We must join IACI regardless. If not, it’s against law so the subcontracting company should take full responsibility. Even if a subcontracting company does not join IACI, injured workers are compensated regardless and the subcontracting company will be fined afterwards.

Pressian: Then, why do you stop them so hard applying for IACI?

A: If industrial accidents frequently occur, the company will be under special supervision by the labor bureau and pointed out with many issues. Subcontracting companies are too poor to correct all those pointed out issues and can almost become bankrupt to improve. This is why we are trying to avoid IACI.

More fundamentally, subcontracting companies walk on “eggshells” of the shipyard owners. We cannot avoid HHI’s influence. Although subcontracting companies are joining IACI independently, we are under HHI’s management as a part of group. HHI’s A department, for instance, manages 5 subcontracting companies and problems begin from this. Let’s say there was an industrial accident at one of “A”’s department managed subcontracting companies. Then, it affects A department as well. If the director of A department is due for a promotion, he or she will be denied if an injury is reported.

All subcontracting companies are aware of promotions. When the promotion season comes, they voluntarily hide industrial accidents because of what actions will be taken against them if managing directors are refused promotions because of them. For example, the number of contract. Subcontracting companies earn livelihood for a month or year by the amount of contracts with a shipyard and they would starve without contracts. Small margined contract is another problem. This is why subcontracting companies walk carefully around shipyard owner. It is a matter of survival.

Pressian: As a result, do you mean you hide industrial accidents to look good to shipyard directors? Then, are you free of concealing accidents if you work with nice directors or it’s not a promotion period?

A: No. Shipyard owners themselves don’t want industrial accidents. If industrial accidents occur frequently, politicians and labor bureau will pay attention to HHI and they will keep an eye on HHI. HHI doesn’t want that so they take all measure to stop this.

Pressian: It is unavoidable to stop attention to companies where many occupational injuries occur. After 8 workers were killed during 2 months on site in 2014, HHI had to undergo a parliamentary inspection and special supervision by labor bureau.

A: Moreover, HHI penalizes subcontracting companies which allows their workers’ IACI application, typically non-contract renewal. Subcontracting companies renew their contracts every year with shipyards. Standards for renewal are performance and evaluation rate.

Shipyard owners determine the contract renewal by their evaluation tools. It’s a ranking system. Subcontracting companies with industrial accidents are penalized so those companies are disadvantaged in renewal.

So wouldn’t subcontracting companies conceal accidents? That’s why we stop our workers applying for IACI.

Pressian: It seems that HHI believes they can reduce the industrial accident rate by penalizing subcontracting companies. However, fundamental solutions are setting safety facilities up in the yard and taking safety measures.

A: That’s right. Without those safety actions, they pass responsibilities onto subcontracting companies. However, how can those poor subcontracting companies install drop sheet and safety fence? In reality, it’s impossible.

“We have to ‘read’ HHI’s mind”

Pressian: Through your story, it sounds like subcontracting companies are ‘voluntarily’ concealing industrial incidents. Have you even been directed to do so by HHI?

A: Frequently asked. The only thing is they don’t directly instruct us to ‘conceal’. If there is an industrial accident, they don’t openly say ‘conceal’.

Pressian: Invisible pressure instead?

A: Yes. We are supposed to report all industrial incidents to shipyard owners when they occur. Managers, directors, executives they all want to be informed so subcontracting company’s managers and directors continuously report the progress such as ‘where the incident occurred, how the patient’s condition is and which hospital he/she was admitted etc. We have to read HHI’s mind’.

Pression: ‘Be quick in sensing a situation’?

A: Yes. Then, what would you say? Won’t you say ‘the patient is absolutely fine’? They give an invisible pressure but it appears as though HHI did not push anything if the incident becomes an issue. The subcontracting company gets screwed up.

Pressian: They may give pressure in various ways even other than industrial accidents.

A: In the nature of work, subcontracting companies and shipyard management have regular meetings. They often humiliate subcontracting company managers. When a subcontracting company manager present ‘This will be proceed with blah blah’, a shipyard manager says ‘What’s the point doing that while you have many injuries..’. Whichever subcontracting company allows their workers’ IACI is hated.

They also compare other subcontracting companies and blame ‘this company worked over 3 million hours incident free but why do you have 2 incidents?’ hurting subcontracting managers’ pride. It’s the way they push subcontracting companies to conceal incidents on their own by humiliating them in public. Everyone knows the company with 3 million hour “incident free” was not by following safety rules but by hiding incidents.

Pressian: So, pointing out ‘why did these incidents happened?’ means ‘Stop your workers applying IACI’?

A: For example, injured workers on site are still being transferred by a company truck. Subcontractor companies have their own trucks and they are moving injured ones with it. However, the shipyard sent an official letter ‘Don’t transfer injured workers by a truck’ to not to do it as it became an issue. It has been sent several times. Industrial accident concealment is the same. They send a letter asking to stop concealing but who would listen to it? The one who follows the instruction is a fool. If someone does, it definitely becomes a problem. Don’t all know why they send us official letters? We all know and hush up.

Pressian: It looks like HHI only shows off words in safety. They keep their eyes closed and ask responsibility to subcontracting companies if the problem comes to the surface. The problem is that the vicious circle is being repeated. Unless this structure changes, effort to conceal industrial incidents would not stop. Thank you for your time.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD Head opened, leg broken..No Worker’s Comp...

Head opened, leg broken..No Worker’s Compensation!

Flashing back 10 years ago in shipyards, there were so many deaths. While welding in a dark LPG cargo tank, he saw a ‘devil-like blooming’ smoke from the tank. It was a fire. The friendly shout of “Bro, come out and have some bread” changed to a scream of “Get out!”. His colleague who told him “Let’s have something and take a break” just a while ago did not come out of the ship alive on that day. He let so many friends go in that way for the last 10 years.

He also just missed several fateful moments. He had his head opened, ribs broken and back hurt many times. However, he never claimed the Worker’s Compensation for fear of reprisal from his employer in Ulsan shipyard.

The shipyard welder, Mr. Young-bae Kim (52) who worked for 11 years at shipyard said, “Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below) was built by our worker’s deaths”.

Subcontracting company owner begged “Help me” when requested Worker’s Compensation

“When I was admitted at the hospital due to broken ribs, it wasn’t even informed to the safety department in HHI. If someone is injured, it should be reported but injuries are usually concealed.”

In August last year, Mr. Kim a subcontract worker of Hyundai Mipo Dockyard fell down from a 2 meter high scaffold. He was chased by the manager that the process was behind schedule and he had to rush to finish even working after hours.

As he welded, sparks flew up everywhere and the flames also went into Mr. Kim’s work shoes. Worried about a burn, he was just about to take off his shoes and the stepping scaffold collapsed. He fell down to the piled equipment and was injured.

There are scaffolds set around the worksite in shipyards, so that they can easily access to work in height but it was loose at the time of injury. ‘The accident was waiting to happen’.

As the fall wasn’t considerably high, he thought it was a minor contusion but he couldn’t move himself or talk. It was a rib fracture.

He was admitted at the hospital. The day after the incident, the subcontracting company manager called him. His first word wasn’t ‘how are you? Are you okay?’ but blame “I’ve seen so many workers with fractures at the shipyard but you’re the one who was admitted at the hospital”.

“I didn’t mean to request the Worker’s Compensation. While working for a shipyard, I have been injured several times, I’ve never thought of the Worker’s Compensation. Not just because of the work atmosphere for subcontract workers but also I can’t cause damage to my company...”

Even though you are injured at work, conceal first. This is an unwritten law for subcontracting companies at shipyard so many occupational injuries are covered up. Though people cut their hands by grinder, break bones by fall from a height, they either pay out of their pocket saying ‘injured at home’ or their subcontracting companies pay medical expenses (providing treatment cost or other compensations under the condition that workers do not request the Worker’s Compensation). This is due to the ‘invisible rule’ that subcontract worker who applies for the Worker’s Compensation must leave the company.

“The shipyard owner gives subcontracting companies pressure to achieve ‘incident free’ environment and subcontracting companies conceal occupational injuries to gain more contracts or renew contract with shipyard but they can no longer hide if their worker reports to Worker’s Compensation. Then, the reported worker cannot survive in the subcontracting company anymore.”, the Metal union HHI branch director, Mr. Chang-min Ha said. He has recently conducted ‘Investigation for Occupational injuries concealment’ six times.

Following the accident, Kim wanted to process his case through the Worker’s Compensation but he agreed to be treated according to their regulation due to company’s ‘pressure’ or ‘begging’. When he first mentioned the Worker’s Compensation, his company owner who never even called him for over a week after the injury came and begged ‘Help me’. His company wasn’t even insured for Worker’s Compensation.

pic : subcontract worker

More than half of HHI subcontract workers, ‘self-pay for work related injuries’

Kim was a rather lucky case. Through long negotiation with his company, he received all treatment cost and 100% daily rate for the days he missed during his admission. It was due to the obvious fault of the company not joining the Worker’s Compensation.

However, most can’t even claim the Worker’s Compensation. According to Hanlim University Education-Industrial Cooperation’s ‘Research for occupational injuries risk high jobs’ requested by National Human Rights Commission last year, only 7.2% of subcontract workers who experienced an occupational injuries benefited from the Worker’s Compensation. 60% were paid by their subcontracting companies, 28% paid out of their own pockets for treatment and 4.8% didn’t even seek treatment.

As to why they did not apply for the Worker’s Compensation (including plural response), the answers were ‘To avoid any disadvantages from shipyard or subcontracting company’ came the first (79) then, ‘By the subcontracting company’s request to not to apply for the Worker’s Compensation’ followed (52).

It was even more serious in HHI alone. According to ‘Investigation for Subcontract workers’ working environment’ conducted by HHI union and subcontracting branch, self-paid for work-related injury was 50.4%, which was more than half. Paid by their subcontracting companies was 43.7% and the Worker’s Compensation case was only 3.7%.

For the reason why cases were not dealt through the Worker’s Compensation process, more than half, 50.9% responded ‘being afraid of disadvantages such as dismissal, subcontracting company’s shut down and being nominated in a blacklist’. ‘By the Subcontracting company’s request followed by the shipyard owner company’s pressure’ came the next at 22.3% and ‘not knowing any information about the Worker’s Compensation application’ followed at 17%.

In conclusion, the vicious circle runs around by subcontracting companies pushing their workers to avoid disadvantages from the shipyard and subcontract workers obey what their companies ask due to the job security.

“In subcontract worker’s point of view, the longer their companies delay time asking to do their own compensation process the more they become anxious. It is a kind of anxiety, ‘Can I return to work after recovery?’.”

Subcontracting companies also put a tearful face on. Even though they want to handle the work injury case through the Worker’s Compensation as per worker’s request, they are not able to ignore the pressure from shipyard. One anonymous HHI subcontracting company manager interviewed with <Pressian> and he said, “We have paid all the Worker’s Compensation fees and I am more than happy for work injury cases to go through the Worker’s Compensation, not paying out of my pocket. If that’s the case however, you will get visible and invisible stress from the shipyard management and be disadvantaged in the contract renewal. Do you think subcontracting company owners want to conceal their worker injuries?”

The astronomical amount of the Worker’s Compensation fee, ‘shipyard of death’ was exempted

In this way, the Worker’s Compensation fee HHI exempted in 2013 was 17 billion won (approx. $15 million)

Sum up the exemption amount for last 5 years (2009~2013), it reaches up to 100 billion won (approx. $90 million). This is because of the structure that counts only their directly hired employees regardless the number of injured subcontract workers and that’s why the ‘outsourcing of danger’ is putting more subcontract workers into dangerous works and is becoming accelerated.

Thus, it is pointed that the statistics of critical occupational injuries should be based on the shipyard not the individual company. Mr. Ha, the Metal union HHI branch director said, “It doesn’t make sense talking about ‘safety’ while the shipyard controls all the process and they chase us to finish a 10 day project within 5 days. The structure itself that the shipyard doesn’t take any responsibility whatever the number of subcontract workers that die on the job is the problem.”

Mr. Ha also said, “HHI safety managers started walking around the shipyard to monitor and issue a ‘penalty ticket’ to workers without proper safety procedures as fatalities grew one after another last year. Then, subcontract workers became busy to hide from them. It wasn’t about their safety but because they couldn’t finish their job on time if caught. This is a structural concern that they naturally care more their employment than safety rule.”

Ms. Mi-hyang Hyun, the director of Ulsan Industrial Accident Free Association said, “It is a reality that subcontract workers are faced with, that they cannot stop working though they know they can get injured.”

“There was a transport signaler’s fatality last year working in bad weather and falling into the sea. He couldn’t see in the dark and rain but he wouldn’t have died if there had been a safety fence.

The reaction towards this incident was different in HHI employees and subcontract workers. Employees said ‘Why would you keep working in that weather’ like the dead one was unadaptable. Subcontract workers, on the other hand responded ‘How could you say no knowing you would lose your job even though it’s dangerous’. Most subcontract workers choose a job over safety as you could suffer dismissal if you refuse dangerous works or apply for the Worker’s Compensation. They work in danger and will survive if lucky but die if not.”

During last year, 13 subcontract workers were killed at HHI and Hyundai Mipo Dockyard. (9 at HHI only) - basically, one per month. The criticism toward the ‘shipyard of death’ was heavier than ever and the Ministry of Employment and Labor ordered additional supervision as well as HHI’s own disaster prevention measures but 2 more subcontract workers were killed consecutively early this year despite the supposed changes.

They were typical ‘traditional accidents’, which could have been prevented with proper safety tools. Mr. Kim said, “I wouldn’t have been injured either if there had been a drop sheet underneath. Both shipyard and subcontracting company owner are interested in only maximizing their profits by finishing contracted work early but not in worker’s safety such as putting safety facilities up. They are busy enough to complete the job so when will they have time to set such a safety facility? Unless this way of process changes, the number of fatalities in HHI will never decrease.”

“From the outside view, HHI is a large and great company but it was also made by worker’s effort. The shipyard was built by deaths. Hyundai did become great not by the owner but by us (that is workers). That’s what I want to say.”,Mr. Kim said

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click

10. "Nobody stops running on a single log bridge" click

11. "What is should be like... what it really is like" click

12. 'Old' blacklist, still valid? click

13. "Jeong Mong-joon is coming to HHI to collect bills" click

14. Pyramid contract 'Mul-yang team', causes death click

15. Norwegian Press reported 'Hyundai Heavy Industry Worker's fatality'...

"Shocking information" click

이 게시물을...

THE KILLED AND INJURED : A TALE OF HYUNDAI SHIPYARD ‘Shipyard ghost story’, the same death in...

‘Shipyard ghost story’, the same death in 2014 as 1994 again?

# 1994

At 2:20 pm on 14th May, Mr. Gwangwoong Kim (45) who worked for Painting team1 of Hyundai Heavy Industry (refer to as HHI below) collapsed. His supervisor found him groaning and transferred him to a hospital but he passed away.

Kim at that time was on the painting job in cargo with his colleagues. His 4 co-workers were painting inside of the cargo and he was holding an air-pump hose outside of the cargo window.

It started heavily raining about an hour after they started working. He was worried that the job inside might be delayed by rain. He looked inside through the space between hatch cover (cargo window cover) and hatch coaming (the surface where ship meets hatch cover). He was killed mysteriously at that moment.

Under the circumstance, it was thought that his body was stuck as the hatch cover was suddenly shut. When needed to operate hatch cover, a signaler should be placed and operate by signs but they didn’t and the incident followed. Working in the rain to advance the completion date was another contributor.

Kim had two young daughters.

Pic : Jung gi hoon

# 2014

Mr. Gyeonghwan Lee (33) was cleaning the inside of hatch cover with his 2 colleagues from 8 am in the morning on 25th October. They finished the work after 30minutes. Then, the head of the working group came to the site and sat on the cockpit to close hatch cover.

The head shouted “Closing”, then, closed the hatch cover. However, Lee wasn’t aware of this and moved to his working station with a washed crowbar. The one who saw this shouted back “Don’t close” but the operator understood this as okay to close and closed the hatch cover.

Lee’s left skull was fractured and he died on the spot. As the open and close of hatch cover involves risks, the guideline mandates to have at least 3 safety personnel in the work place but obviously, they didn’t and the incident happened.

Signalers should take a thorough look around by the operator’s instruction and conduct safety checks. Then, the operator should open or close hatch cover by a sign of signaler if there is no safety issue but signs were not in accordance due to the shortage of staff.

It had been only 3 months since Lee joined the HHI’s subcontracting company. He had a 3 year old son.

Ongoing and repeated fatalities in HHI since established in 1972

Both the caThe cause and place for death were the same. The only difference is the victim in 1994 was a HHI’s employee but the one in 2014 was a subcontract worker.

These ‘deaths’ were not limited in one-time incident but the ‘conventional fatalities’ are being repeated. According to Ulsan Industrial Accident Free Association, 22 workers were killed in 1974 building ships. 19 in 1975, 15 in 1976 and 23 in 1977 were killed. Since then, it seemed the number decreased. 12 in 1978, 17 in 1979, 17 in 1980 and 12 in 1981 were reported but they were still double figures.

It was 1985 that the number came down to a single figure and it was maintained since then. From 1990s, subcontract workers started dying since it buckled down to labor outsourcing. However, the type of death was almost identical. The only change was the victim, from permanent employee to subcontract worker.

In particular, Mr. Yun was killed by stricture between a crane and column in December 1992.Mr. Seo died from a fall in February 1996 and Mr. Moon also by stricture. Mr. Kim and other 3 were killed by a block flipped over.

The causes of death were similar in 2000s; fall, stricture and suffocating. One fell down to his death as a basket latched onto the scaffold’s handrail and another fell during a cleaning job. Another died from a fall by a block that flipped over. There were uncountable injuries on top of these. The difference compared to before 2000 was all these fatalities were occurred by subcontract workers.

Repeating deaths, is this HHI only?

The attention point is that these ‘conventional injuries’ are not limited to only HHI. According to ‘The statistics of Major shipyards’ critical occupational incident’ summarized by Metal union, 51 workers were killed from 1996 to 2013 at Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). Most were killed by conventional accidents such as fall (16), crush (15) and explosion and suffocation (10).

23 workers also died in Hanjin Heavy Industry from 1995 to 2010. At Sungdong Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, 15 were killed by critical incidents between 2002 and 2014. Again, traditional accidents.

Mr. Semin Park, Health and Safety director at Metal union said, “About 400 workers were killed by suffocating, fall and fire etc. at HHI since the company was founded and it was because even basic safety actions were not taken. Since the labor has been outsourced since 2000, the job title is different from employee to subcontract worker but the structure that workers die on the job is still the same”.

He also said, “The type of frequently occurred incidents were carbon copies from the early days of HHI and this is being occurred not only at HHI but also other shipyards”.

Front page http://old.laborhealth.or.kr/41059

Preface of <The Cruel history of Shipyards> Click

Table of Contents

1. Fall to sea! Why didn't they call 119 ? click

2. "Wish I could remove the word of 'suicide' covered with my husband" click

3. 13 deaths within a year at the 'death factory'... what happened? click

4. [Infographic] People in the 'hell ship', how were they killed? click

5. 'Shipyard ghost story', the same death in 2014 as 1994 again? click

6. Head opened, leg broken.. No Worker's Compensation! click

7. Blowing the whistle "How did I blackmail them?" click

8. 'Smashing' subcontracting companies, 'choking' workers click

9. "Occupational injury?" You didn't call 119, did you? click